The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Throughout the Cold War, the United States developed numerous ideas for nuclear weapons: some good, and many that were bad. However, in the context of the Cold War, it was feared that the United States would not have a sufficient number of troops to fight off a Soviet invasion. As a result, tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) were viewed as the only thing that could “even the odds” against columns of advancing Soviet tanks. In addition, many of these nuclear weapons were developed in the 1950s and 1960s, during a time of great interservice rivalry, which resulted in a “nuclear good and plenty.”[1] Leaders in the Army and Navy raised the argument that the Air Force should not be the only service branch with nuclear weapons. In the new nuclear battlefield, some predicted that the Navy would become obsolete and large ground forces would as well.

In this context, the Army developed weapons such as the Davy Crockett recoilless rifle, the Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM) and Medium Atomic Demolition Munition (MADM) and “Atomic Annie,” a 280mm artillery gun. All of these weapons were actively deployed in Germany and Korea to stop massed Soviet tank formations in conjunction with each other to create massive roadblocks of destroyed tanks. The “Davy Crockett,” colloquially known as a “nuclear bazooka,” was the smallest nuclear weapon that ever entered American service. Possibly one of the most bizarre weapons to emerge out of the Cold War, it had a yield of 10 to 20 tons (“tiny” in comparison to other nuclear weapons, but “huge” when compared to conventional weapons). It had a range of 2 to 12 miles and was both man-portable and able to be transported on the back of a Jeep (See “How Big is A Kiloton?” for an image of the Davy Crockett.)[2]

The SADM, often labeled as a “backpack nuke,” was planned to be carried by Special Forces teams and planted at an airfield or an industrial target. In theory, these soldiers would be able to escape the blast, however, the carriers realized that the employment of the SADM was a one-way trip. The MADM was a nuclear land mine (really!) which was planned to be placed in Europe to destroy Soviet armored columns.[3]

An inert SADM on display at the National Museum of Nuclear Science and History in Albuquerque, New Mexico (Photo by T. Backus)

Finally, “Atomic Annie” was a scaled up 240mm artillery gun (the largest in the U.S. arsenal) that could fire a 15 kT shell a distance of twenty miles. Officially named the “M65 Atomic Cannon,” 20 were built by the U.S. Army, but only one live test fire was ever conducted in 1953. Additionally, due to the advancing technology of missiles and rockets, “Atomic Annie” was quickly made obsolete. Despite this, the M65 cannon was deployed to Korea and Germany in a clear show-of-force to the Soviet Union. [4]

In addition, the primary fear of the U.S. military during the early years of the Cold War was that American air defenses were insufficient to protect against massed formations of Soviet bombers. Similar to the fear that land forces would be insufficient to deter a Soviet armored thrust, many feared that current air defenses would be unable to defend against waves of incoming bombers. In response, the Army developed the Nike Hercules surface to air missile, which could carry either a 2, 20 or 40 kT warhead to be fired into massed formations of bombers.[5]

During this time, the Navy also developed their own low-yield nuclear weapons to be deployed on ships. The Navy’s primary nuclear weapons included nuclear depth charges, named the Mk-101 “Lulu” and a nuclear anti-submarine rocket (ASROC). Both the nuclear depth charge and the ASROC had yields of 11 kT and 10 kT, respectively. After launch, the weapons would sink to a pre-determined depth and detonate. However, it was soon realized that the nuclear depth charge lacked a safety device-if it were to accidentally roll off a ship, it could detonate when it sank to the pre-set depth.

Finally, while the Air Force maintained an arsenal of nuclear weapons for missiles and bombs, it also introduced the AIR-2 Genie nuclear tipped unguided rocket in 1957. Similar to the Nike Hercules, it was intended to be fired into Soviet bomber formations. To illustrate the safety of the Genie rocket, “Operation Plumbbob John” was conducted on July 19, 1957. In a highly publicized event, Air Force personnel stood underneath the detonation of the 2 kT nuclear warhead.[6]

If these ideas seem ridiculous, they were. It soon became apparent in testing that many of these weapons were greatly inaccurate and the resulting radiation would be extremely high, so much so that the troops firing it would not be able to be protected or escape. However, these weapons were viewed as the only solution that would present American forces with the slightest chance of survival in a Soviet attack.

 

[1] Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2012), 47.

[2] L. Douglas Keeny, 15 Minutes: General Curtis LeMay and the Countdown to Nuclear Annihilation (New York: St. Martins Press, 2011), 280.

[3] Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident and the Illusion of Safety (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), 416.

[4] Schlosser, 268.

[5] Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and Milton Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume I: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987), 45.

[6] Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, “Five at Ground Zero,” CTBTO.org, 2010, http://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/19-july-1957-five-at-ground-zero/.

The Fallout from Castle Bravo

In the early 1950s, both the Soviet Union and the United States were conducting numerous atmospheric (above ground) nuclear tests. By 1952, the United States detonated the world’s first hydrogen (thermonuclear) bomb, code named “Ivy Mike.” The bomb detonated with a yield of 10 megatons (10 million tons of TNT), however the bomb was too physically large to be considered operational.  The entire device weighed over eighty tons and a separate building had to be constructed to house the device.

The Ivy Mike “Sausage” device. Photo credit Wikipedia

However, in 1953, the Soviet Union conducted a test of their own thermonuclear device, and most importantly, it was small enough to be deliverable by aircraft.[1] As the nuclear arms race of the Cold War continued, the Soviet Union and the United States continued to detonated larger and large bombs. In March 1954, the United States detonated the largest thermonuclear weapon in its history: “Castle Bravo.” It had a predicted yield of six megatons (six million tons of TNT), but due to a miscalculation, the bomb detonated with a force of fifteen megatons (approximately one thousand times more powerful than the Hiroshima bomb.) It subjected many of the personnel involved in the test to excessive levels of radiation, along with subjecting the crew of a Japanese fishing boat, the Lucky Dragon, to a fatal dose of radiation.[2]

 

The Japanese fishing boat “Lucky Dragon” (Photo credit: 

https://www.wagingpeace.org/tag/nuclear-testing/)

The widespread radioactive contamination from Castle Bravo caused a widespread concern over the effects of atmospheric nuclear testing. By February of the following year, numerous newspapers released articles detailing the new fear of radiation. However, the news articles did not describe how long bombed areas would remain radioactive or any of the long-term, cancer causing effects of radiation. A New York Times article on March 12 explained that, “twenty-eight Americans and 236 natives were ‘unexpectedly’ subjected to ‘some radiation’ during the recent atomic test in the Marshal Islands but all those exposed were reported well.”[3] The Los Angeles Times, warned, “Fallout from hydrogen bomb tests in the Pacific may be blanketing the West-and the entire nation-with longer and stronger effects than ever before.”[4] The Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) made it clear that the majority of casualties caused by an atomic attack would be caused from people not taking the proper precautions, such as building fallout shelters, rather than from fallout. As before, an atomic attack was dangerous, but survivable.

For many years, the illusion that a nuclear attack was survivable was maintained. To be sure, it would have been inconceivable for the U.S. military to understand the long term effects of radiation when they would not be exhibited for twenty or thirty more years. However, the short term health effects of radiation became clear when the local inhabitants of the Marshall Islands living downwind of the test began to exhibit symptoms of acute radiation poisoning. Within years, birth defects began to be exhibited in children born to the islanders (For a clear illustration of these effects, do a Google Search for “jellyfish babies.” I will not post those pictures here, as they are very, very graphic. You have been warned).

Not until 1968 were the islanders of the Marshall Islands invited to return to their homes, with President Lyndon Johnson insisting that the islands were safe for habitation. However, due to the long-term effects of radioactive fallout, many of the plants and animals remained highly radioactive. As the native inhabitants of Bikini realized that their homeland was not safe, many islanders questioned and distrusted the deception of the U. S. government. In 1975, many of the islanders filed suit against the government. At this point, the Atomic Energy Commission was forced to admit that the bomb tests caused severe long term effects. Several millions of dollars of compensation began to be dispensed annually.[5] For many, however, this compensation is not sufficient.

A satellite view of the Bikini Atoll today. (Photo credit: 

http://earthobservatory.nasa.gov/IOTD/view.php?id=83237)

Today, locals continue to suffer from health problems and birth defects. Parts of the islands remain radioactive, and those islanders that are able to return desire not to, out of fear of radiation. Furthermore, the islanders have no way to end the cycle of poverty that they find themselves in. Alcoholism is rampant and many commit suicide as they see no way out.[6]

 

[1] Thomas Reed and Danny Stillman, The Nuclear Express: A Political History of the Bomb and Its Proliferation (Minneapolis: Zenith Press, 2010), 36.

[2] Spencer Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear (Cambridge: Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012), 98.

[3] “264 Exposed to Atom Radiation After Nuclear Blast in Pacific,” New York Times, March 12, 1954, 1.

[4] “H-Bomb Radiation May Be Blanketing Nation,” Los Angeles Times, May 16, 1954, 17.

[5] Costandina Titus, Bombs in the Backyard: Atomic Testing and American Politics (Las Vegas: University of Nevada Press, 1986), 98.

[6] Dan Zak, “A Ground Zero Forgotten,” Washington Post, accessed March 27, 2016, http://www.washingtonpost.com/sf/national/2015/11/27/a-ground-zero-forgotten/.