The Titan Missile Silo Part II, or How to Launch a Nuclear Missile

If the launch order was given, it would come through a set of speakers that was next to the Missile Combat Crew Commander’s (MCCC) station and Deputy Missile Combat Crew Commander’s (DMCCC) station.  The MCCC and DMCCC would hear a message that began with a loud ringing noise, and sounded something like this: “ALPHA TWO THREE CHARLIE HOTEL FOXTROT….”

The launch commander’s station. The speakers are on the left hand side of the console. (Photo by T. Backus).

The phrase “Alpha Two” was the first indication for the crew that the message was an authentic order, and not a drill. This code would only come from one of two places: Washington D.C. (the President himself) or from a secondary location in California if Washington, D.C. was destroyed. The MCCC and DMCCC would immediately grab two red binders and write down the code that was being broadcast. At the end of the transmission, the MCCC and DMCCC would exchange binders to check their work. If the codes matched, this was considered a “Valid Launch Order.” They would then both stand up and walk to a red, double lock safe that stated “ENTRY RESTRICTED TO MCCC AND DMCCC ON DUTY.” Ominously called the “Go To War Safe,” the MCCC and DMCCC did not know each other’s codes to the safe. They would open the safe and find a set of small manila envelopes called authenticator cards.

The “Go To War” safe (Photo by T. Backus).

Both crewmembers would then find the authenticator card that matched with the first two letters of the transmitted code. In addition, the crews would also receive a six-letter code which allowed them to unlock the “butterfly valve.” This was a mechanical valve on the base of the missile that would not allow the rocket engines to fire unless the code was entered correctly. If the butterfly valve code was entered more than six times incorrectly, the missile would be rendered inoperative.

If the codes matched, this allowed the crew to place their launch keys into the console. The keyholes were placed on opposite ends of the room, so that not one person could turn both keys. In addition, the keys must be turned within two seconds of each other, and held for five seconds.

The launch control console (Photo by T. Backus).

Upon the turning of the keys, the “LAUNCH ENABLE” light would illuminate on the console, along with “BATTERIES ACTIVATED.” This would activate the power onboard the missile, instead of the missile being dependent on power from the silo. Next, the 760-ton silo door would slide open, and the “SILO SOFT” indicator light would turn on. This would indicate that the silo door was now open and vulnerable to a nuclear counter-strike. Four seconds later, the explosive bolts holding the missile in place would detonate, and the missile would launch.

But where would it go?

During the operational years of Titan, the actual targets for the missile were strictly classified, even for the crews. The only indicator to where the missile was targeted were three switches on the console that read “TARGET 1,” “TARGET 2” and “TARGET 3.” This particular missile was permanently aimed at “Target 2,” which many speculate was a Soviet missile silo. The missile also could be pre-set to “GROUND”  or “AIR.” “Ground” meant that the warhead would detonate at ground level, which would be utilized against hardened targets, such as bunkers or missile silos. “Air” meant that the warhead would detonate as an airburst about 3,000 feet above the ground.

The Titan II in its silo (Photo credit: T. Backus)

The crews of each Titan missile knew what would happen if the missile was launched. They were well aware that their silos or the areas around them would become a nuclear wasteland. In the Titan II procedures binder, the crews are instructed to “Await Further Orders” after a launch. The silos were equipped with enough food and water for approximately one month, and contained an escape hatch at the rear of the control center.

This particular Titan II silo was in service from 1963 to 1982. When all of the Titan missiles were decommissioned, 571-7 was saved, however, the silo door must be welded open along with a hole drilled in the top of the warhead to comply with an arms control treaty.

The Titan II missile silo serves as a powerful reminder of the “MAD-ness” of the Cold War. A 9 megaton nuclear warhead, as carried by Titan II, would turn a city the size of Tuscon, along with much of the surrounding area, to ash. This very premise of a massive nuclear strike kept the peace in a very perverse way for the entirety of the Cold War.

The Titan Missile Silo, Part 1

In the entire United States, there are two locations where the public can see a completely intact missile silo. The first is the Minuteman National Historic Park in North Dakota. However, tours are conducted very rarely and are only limited to six people.  The second, however, is the Titan Missile Museum in Green Valley, Arizona about 30 minutes south of Tucson. Over Labor Day Weekend in 2016, I had the unique experience of touring the Titan missile museum on a one hour guided tour.

The Arizona Aerospace Foundation has made every effort to re-create what the original Titan silo looked like during operation. The silo itself is number 571-7 (571^st Strategic Missile Squadron, Silo Number 7) and is the only remaining Titan II silo left in the world. The Titan II missile was (and still is) the largest nuclear weapon ever to enter Air Force service.  Over 100 feet tall, and carrying a massive 9 megaton nuclear warhead, the missile had a range of over 9,000 miles. If detonated, the warhead would produce a fireball nearly three miles wide.

In Arizona, there were 18 Titan II silos, out of 63 missiles total produced. Many (such as 571-7) were constructed in the early 1960s and decommissioned in the 1980s for the simple reason of modernization. The Air Force realized that the technology of the Titan II was simply becoming outdated. The missile silos still relied on punched paper tape (similar to punch cards) to communicate with the outside world. The computers in the Titan silo boasted an impressive 4K of usable memory, and 16K after an upgrade by the Air Force.

A punched tape reader in the Titan II silo (Photo by T. Backus).

The primary distinguishing feature of Titan II was the fuel. Unlike previous missiles such as the Atlas and Titan I, the propellant could be stored for long periods of time, and were hypergolic. This means that upon contact, the fuel and oxidizer would ignite spontaneously without the need for igniters. Atlas and Titan I required 15-20 minutes to fuel. Titan II could be launched in approximately 90 seconds. Despite this, the fuel for Titan II was highly toxic. To fuel the missile, crew members had to wear a special Rocket Fuel Handler’s Clothing Outfit (RFHCO, pronounced “Ruf-co”) to protect themselves. These suits were highly uncomfortable and hot: crewmembers could only wear the RFHCO for fifteen minutes at a time in the Arizona summer.

Two Titan crewmembers wearing the RFHCOs.

Okay, enough specifics. Let’s get to the tour.

As you drive up to the museum, you will immediately notice a large sign that states: “WARNING. U.S. AIR FORCE INSTALLATION. IT IS UNLAWFUL TO ENTER THIS AREA WITHOUT PERMISSION OF THE INSTALLATION COMMANDER.” To the immediate left is a much more friendly looking visitor’s center, where one pays for the tickets and can take a self-guided tour of a small museum before entering into the silo itself.

The entrance gate (Photo by T. Backus).

The museum has a small collection of Cold War-related memorabilia, including a television that plays “Duck and Cover,” an Air Force uniform and a mock-up of a Titan warhead. Tours are conducted every hour, and the museum allows visitors something to look at while they wait for the next tour.

At the start of the tour, the docent ushers the group into a room with a large television screen that tells a brief history of the Cold War and the Titan II program. At the end of the 20 minute movie, the docents (who are all former Titan crewmembers) take the group outside to the underground entrance to the silo. The docent specifically details the process that Titan II crewmembers took to enter into the silo and begin their shift.

First, the Titan crewmembers would drive up to the outer perimeter fence. One crewmember would get out and make the first of four phone calls to enter the silo. This crewmember would give the names, serial numbers and ranks of all the people inside the vehicle. The crew who was waiting to be relieved inside the silo would open the front gate electronically.

As the gate opened, the rest of the crew would get out of the car. They would preform a security inspection of the above ground portion of the silo. While this was occurring, the most senior member would make the second phone call. He would stand in front of the access hatch and again give the name, serial numbers and rank of the crew. He would also receive a one-time use alphabetic code which he writes down and the crew will use to enter the first door of the silo.

Once the rest of the crew has completed the above ground check, the crew walks down a flight of stairs and enters through the first of two blast doors. Once the crew closes this first door behind them, the third phone call is made. The senior crewmember again gives the name, rank and serial number of the crews along with the code. If the code that the senior crewmember has matches the code that was issued, the second blast door is unlocked. In addition, the senior crewmember lights the paper that the code was written on fire. He throws the burning paper into a red coffee can to ensure that the code can never be used again.

The red coffee can (Photo by T. Backus).

The crew then proceeds down a flight of stairs to the fourth and final phone. The senior crewmember again gives the name, rank and serial number of the crew. The second blast door is opened for the crew to enter into the silo. This blast door was made out of one solid piece of steel, and there are no bubbles or cracks which could potentially compromise the integrity of the 6,000 pound door. In addition, the entire complex is built on large springs and all furniture is bolted to the floor, to ensure that if a nuclear attack were to happen, the crew would survive.

The crew then begins their shift. In every place except the living quarters, all crewmembers must travel with another crew member. This was called the “Two Man Rule” or the “No Lone Zone.” This was done for two reasons. First, there were many places in the Titan silo where someone could fall and hurt themselves. A second person would ensure that help would always be close by. Second, put quite simply, we’re dealing with nuclear weapons here. The “two man rule” makes sure that nobody can attempt to sabotage or even launch the missile by themselves.

To the surprise of many, Titan II silos did not have guards with M16s in armored vehicles guarding the sites. They did not need them. Behind the main fence of all Titan II silos, there were eight Doppler radar dishes on all four corners of the silo. The official name was the AN/TPS-39, but crews renamed this to “Tipsi.” Each radar dish would project an invisible radar beam around the perimeter of the silo and over the control center door. If the beam was broken, it would set off an alarm inside the silo. If this alarm was triggered, the missile crew would radio the base patrol to investigate.

The AN/TPS-39 “Tipsi” radar dishes. 

But how do you launch this thing? That’s next.

The Nuclear Triad

Recently, there has been much debate over the American “nuclear triad.” But what is “the triad” exactly? Why do we have it?  Originally, the thinking behind the triad was based in the idea that if one leg of the triad became inoperable, the two other legs would still exist. In other words, if a Soviet nuclear strike destroyed all of the bomber bases, the United States would still be able to respond with its ICBMs and SLBMs.

At its heart, the triad is the basis for getting a nuclear warhead from “Point A” to “Point B.” Each “leg” of the triad represents a different delivery system. One “leg” represents aircraft and includes bombers, such as the B-52, and fighters, such as the F-16 and F-15. The second leg covers silo-based missiles. Currently, this only applies to the Minuteman intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The final section of the triad applies to submarine launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and refers to the Trident.  During the Cold War, the triad was not so simplistic. Interservice rivalry along with the political atmosphere of the Cold War caused the triad to become a complex and convoluted structure. I will attempt to explain it in the clearest way possible.

Section 1: Aircraft

In the late 1940s and early 1950s, nuclear technology was in its infancy. Nuclear weapons were so heavy that they could only be transported by the largest bomber aircraft, such as the B-29 and B-36. Initially, these bombers were the only nuclear deterrent that the United States possessed. In an attempt to solve the problem of the limited range of bombers, initial proposals called for the construction of multiple overseas bomber bases at the borders of the Soviet Union, along with additional development into aerial refueling technology so that bombers could remain aloft for an indefinite period of time.[1]  However, it was soon realized that it was not cost-effective in the long run to maintain numerous overseas bases with constant bomber patrols. As nuclear weapons became smaller, bombers began to represent flexibility with regard to weaponry. Rather than a single sized nuclear warhead, such as on an ICBM, an aircraft could utilize anything from a 15-kT cruise missile to a 9-mT bomb.

Section II: ICBMs

A dedicated investment in long-range ballistic missile development did not start until the early 1950s, when American intelligence reports indicated that the Soviet Union was developing their own ICBM. Even then, progress was slow as many Air Force generals feared that the unmanned ICBM would replace manned bombers.[2] In addition, technological hurdles slowed the program even more. An ICBM needed to be able hit its target from great distances way with pinpoint accuracy, and Air Force leadership was simply unwilling to invest large amounts of money into a yet untested program when bombers worked just fine. Plus, bombers were sexy. There was just something unsportsmanlike about flinging unmanned nuclear warheads at each other from opposite ends of the globe.[3]

This attitude towards ICBMs began to change with the development of multi-megaton hydrogen bombs. As Professor Alex Wellerstein writes, “With yields in the megaton range, suddenly it didn’t seem to matter as much if you couldn’t get the accuracy that high. You can miss by a lot with a megaton and still destroy a given target.”[4] In 1959, America’s first ICBM, the Atlas, began to be deployed around the United States. However, the limitations of Atlas was soon realized. Early versions relied on radio control for guidance, rather than gyroscopes, and had to be fueled with highly flammable fuel prior to firing.[5]

The Atlas missile being prepared for firing. Note the horizontal launch canister (Photo credit: Wikipedia).

In 1962, missile technology improved greatly with the introduction of the Minuteman. Unlike previous missiles, it was solid fueled, and therefore was able to remain fueled indefinitely, and had a truly intercontinental range of 6,000 miles. Despite Air Force Colonel Edward Hall’s lobbying, the Air Force saw no pressing need for the Minuteman.[6] The accuracy of missiles such as the Atlas and Titan were improving, along with technology to store liquid fuels for an extended period of time. However, Air Force leadership soon realized that the Minuteman’s onboard computer approached the accuracy of manned bombers: a Minuteman fired from the continental United States could hit its target in the Soviet Union within 1,500 feet.[7] Since the 1960s, the Minuteman has been continuously upgraded and currently is the only silo-based missile in service with the United States.

Section III: SLBMS

Nearly in parallel to the Air Force’s acquisition of ICBM’s was the U.S. Navy’s development of submarine launched ballistic missiles, or SLBMs. As early as the end of World War II, the U.S. Navy had been experimenting with launching early cruise missiles from surfaced submarines. This situation was far from ideal, as a surfaced submarine presented a huge target, and the Navy wanted to be able to fire a solid-fueled missile from a submerged submarine.

In 1960, this dream was realized. Named the Polaris, the missile had a range of approximately 2,800 miles and carried 3 warheads, each delivering a yield of 200 kT each. Polaris represented a radical restructuring in the dynamic political environment of the Cold War. Unlike a silo based missile, a submarine could hide underwater from surveillance satellites until it was time to deliver a nuclear strike. In addition, SLBMs represented a “second strike” weapon: if silo based missiles and land based bombers were destroyed in a nuclear attack, submarines would be able to survive the initial strike and counterattack. Furthermore, SLBMs could be used in a surprise attack: a submarine could hide underwater for an indefinite period of time within range of its target, then launch its missiles and slip away.

A Polaris missile (Photo credit: Wikipedia).

Over time, as with the Air Force’s ICBMs, SLBM technology improved allowing the missiles to be more accurate and fly even farther. Currently, the Trident D5 represents the U.S. Navy’s nuclear deterrent and the third leg of the triad.

In the present, some have argued that the nuclear triad is a relic of the Cold War. Others insist that it is necessary in order to maintain a strong nuclear deterrent. Whether or not the triad is necessary is a highly contentious topic and one that is best left for another time. However, it is necessary that the public remain informed regarding America’s current state of nuclear forces, as an ill-informed populace runs the risk of making poor decisions regarding our foreign policy.

 

[1] L. Douglas Keeney, 15 Minutes: General Curtis LeMay and the Countdown to Nuclear Annihilation (New York: St. Martins Press, 2011), 197.

[2] Neil Sheehan, A Fiery Peace in a Cold War (New York: Random House, 2009), 265.

[3] Ibid.

[4] Alex Wellerstein, “A Brief History of the Nuclear Triad,” Restricted Data: The Nuclear Secrecy Blog, accessed July 23, 2016, http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/.

[5] Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Incident and the Illusion of Safety (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), 222.

[6] Donald MacKenzie, Inventing Accuracy: A Historical Society of Missile Guidance (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Massachusetts Institute of Technology Press, 1993), 153.

[7] MacKenzie, 166.

Why is Radiation Green?

Ask someone what color they normally associate with radiation and they’ll almost universally answer “green.” From TV shows such as “The Simpsons”, comic books, and even video games, whenever anything radioactive or nuclear is a key plot element, it is almost always incorrectly depicted as an bright, glowing green substance . In reality, elements such as uranium and plutonium are grey or silver, and radiation itself is invisible. So why green? While there’s no “set” answer to the popular depiction of radioactive items as a green, glowing substance (after all, wouldn’t red be more sinister?), the most probable answer can be traced to radium.

Radium was first discovered in 1898 by Marie and Pierre Curie.[1] Initially, radium had no practical application. However, it was soon discovered that radium, while naturally a grey-brown color, glowed bright green in the dark. Upon this realization, many realized the new potential that radium represented-both in civil and military applications. Pilots could now see their instruments in the dark without any difficulty. Instrument panels on machines no longer needed to be illuminated by electric lights. The average person would now be able to see what time it was at any time of day. In 1917, the U.S. Radium Corporation was founded, which hired young women to paint watches and instrument dials with  radium paint, named “Undark” by the company.

A collection of various clocks and watches with radium dials (Photo credit: EPA.gov). 

In order to paint the detailed designs on porcelain, it was necessary that the tip of the paintbrush be licked to create a fine point. This same procedure was used with radium paint, which caused the workers to ingest massive amounts of radium. Over time, these women began to develop “radium jaw,”- causing their gums to bleed and teeth to fall out. Some workers, unaware of the dangers of radiation, and enticed by its eerie green glow, painted their nails and lips with radium paint as well.[2]

However, as more and more of the “radium girls” fell ill, they soon began to suspect that the radium paint was the culprit, and that their employer, the U.S. Radium Corporation, was concealing the true danger. Initially, their claims of radiation poisoning were dismissed. In an attempt to tarnish the reputation of the workers, the company blamed their sickness on syphilis.[3]

Partially contributing to this dismissive response was the naïve attitude that many Americans held towards radiation during this time. Radium and radiation were viewed as having an unlimited potential. Some predicted that radium could be used to paint the insides of homes, thereby eliminating the need for electric lights. Radium-infused consumer goods, such as patent medicines, hair tonics, and even toothpastes were rampant, and while it is debatable if all of these items actually contained radium or not, the idea of the curative properties of radiation still remained.[4]

One of the many radium-infused “health tonics” of the early 20th century (Photo credit: Wikipedia). 

In 1928, however, this attitude drastically changed. Grace Fryer, an employee of U.S. Radium, finally managed to find a lawyer who was willing to take on her case. At the start of the trial in January, the five workers who joined Fryer were so ill that they were not able to raise their arms to swear an oath in court. Finally, by the autumn, the “Radium Girls” won their case. Each worker was paid $10,000 ($138,000 in 2015), along with $600 ($8,300 in 2015) per year. In addition, U.S. Radium would pay for all legal and medical expenses incurred.[5]

Grace Fryer painting a watch face (Photo credit: Wikipedia). 

The lawsuit against U.S. Radium illustrated to many members of the public that radium and radiation was not a “cure-all” that they had been led to believe. Many of the radium-based consumer goods were taken off the shelves and radiation began to be viewed with a healthy dose of skepticism, rather than a cure.

This fearful attitude towards radiation remains to this day, along with the depiction of radioactive elements and radiation as green.  While this depiction is incorrect, the association of “radiation = green” is one that shall remain in popular culture for years to come.

 

[1] Royal Society of Chemistry, “Radium,” Accessed July 21, 2016, http://www.rsc.org/periodic-table/element/88/radium.

[2] Denise Grady, “A Glow in the Dark and a Lesson in Science,” New York Times, October 6, 1998, accessed July 21, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1998/10/06/science/a-glow-in-the-dark-and-a-lesson-in-scientific-peril.html?pagewanted=all.

[3] Ross Mullner, Deadly Glow: The Radium Dial Worker Tragedy (Washington, D.C: American Public Health Association, 1999), 20.

[4] Jean Matricon and Georges Waysand, The Cold Wars: A History of Superconductivity (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 2003), 113.

[5] “Newark Pathologist Shows Part of Miss Maggia’s Jaw,” Star Eagle, October 18, 1927.

“Hitting A Bullet With Another Bullet”

Warfare has always been a continuous cycle of “challenge and response.” The invention of the tank immediately caused the development of anti-tank rifles and armor-piercing ammunition to counter this new threat. This same phenomenon occurred with the development of the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) along with missiles to shoot it down.

In 1953, the U.S. military’s first surface-to-air guided missile, named Nike Ajax, entered service. However, the military quickly realized the other potential uses that this missile would have. Within two years, the U.S. Army undertook a program to upgrade the Nike Ajax into a missile which would be able to intercept incoming ballistic missiles. The program took on a new urgency in 1957, when the Soviet Union launched their first intercontinental ballistic missile, the R-7 Semyorka. Due to great interservice rivalry, the new missile, the Nike Zeus, did not enter service until 1962.[1]

The Nike-Zeus missile (Photo credit: Wikipedia).

It soon became clear that the Nike Zeus only worked on paper. Two issues were apparent. First, the Nike Zeus was too vulnerable to decoys from enemy missiles, and second, the growing number of Soviet ICBMs meant that the system would quickly becoming too expensive for practical use. Some predicted that it would take twenty Nike Zeus missiles to shoot down a single Soviet ICBM.[2] The military quickly returned to the drawing board, and in 1967, the U.S. military announced the Sentinel Program. It utilized a system of radars along with the Spartan missile interceptor to shoot down incoming ballistic missiles. However, the issue of placing nuclear-armed anti-ballistic missiles (ABMs) in American cities became highly politicized. Many argued that it made American cities an even greater target for Soviet missiles along with concerns that one of the ABMs would detonate accidentally. In other words, “H-bombs would be in the backyard.”[3] Due to this negative public reception, Sentinel was cancelled.

Two years later, Sentinel was replaced by Safeguard. Instead of building ABM sites in American cities, this time, the missiles were clustered around missile bases to act as a defense. In theory, if a nuclear attack were to occur, U.S. defense planners figured that the Soviet Union would attempt to target American missile silos first. The program utilized a two-tier system: the Spartan interceptor would shoot down incoming missiles at a distance, and a second missile, named Sprint, would shoot down any other warheads that Spartan failed to hit.[4] The need for a second set of interceptors reflected the primary fear of the U.S. military at the time: that there would not be enough time to successfully intercept incoming enemy missiles.

A Sprint missile after firing (Photo credit: Wikipedia).

With the introduction of laser technology in the 1960s, many began to realize their potential for missile defense. Rather than attempting to fire an ABM at precisely the right moment and hope that it intercepts the incoming missile, a laser was potentially far more accurate and faster. Extensive testing was conducted primarily at White Sands Missile Range in New Mexico during the 1980s which evaluated the potential application of lasers in missile defense. In 1983, President Ronald Regan formally announced the start of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI, popularly known as “Star Wars” due to its futuristic nature). SDI used a complex system of space-based lasers, satellites and ground based interceptors to provide a layered system of defense.

An artist’s rendering of the SDI System (Photo credit: Wikipedia). 

However, in the eyes of the Soviet Union, SDI was inherently destabilizing. From the Soviet perspective, a system such as SDI-which the Soviets had no direct competitor to-made the United States invulnerable to a nuclear attack. In other words, the United States could launch a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union without any fear of a retaliatory strike.[5] For this reason, along with the high cost and ambitious nature of the program, SDI was cancelled.

During this time, the U.S. Army also realized that their current surface to air missiles, such as the Hawk, were aging rapidly. In 1975, the military conducted the first successful test fire of the Patriot missile at White Sands Missile Range.[6] Initially, the Patriot served exclusively as a surface to air missile to shoot down enemy aircraft. With the failure of SDI and the need for a replacement ABM system, the Patriot began to replace the Spartan missile. By the late 1980s, an ABM version of the Patriot, the Patriot Advanced Capability (PAC)-2, entered service in time for the Persian Gulf War.

A Patriot missile battery (Photo credit: japantimes.co.jp).

The missile’s performance in the First Gulf War remains controversial. Initially deployed to defend against SCUD missiles fired from Iraq, Army records indicate that the missile engaged enemy targets forty times, however, some have argued that no enemy missiles were actually shot down. Further criticism was leveled at the system in the aftermath of a successful Iraqi SCUD attack on a U.S. military barracks in Dhahran, Saudi Arabia.[7]

In the aftermath of the Gulf War, the system underwent a massive overhaul. Many analysts have theorized that the missile’s performance problems stemmed from the Patriot’s original design as an anti-aircraft missile, rather than an ABM.[8] In the late 1990s and early 2000s, a third upgrade to the Patriot system, the PAC-3, also known as the Medium Extended Air Defense System (MEADS) entered service.

The most recent addition to the U.S. military’s missile defense is the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) missile. Entering service in 2008, THAAD is meant to be used against high altitude, rather than low and medium altitude missiles. Recent debates have erupted regarding the deployment of THAAD to South Korea as a defense against potential North Korean ballistic missile launches.[9]

A THAAD missile firing (Photo credit: Wikipedia). 

In conclusion, as technology advanced throughout the Cold War, both the United States and the Soviet Union entered into a massive technological and military arms race while one country always tried to outpace the other. Thankfully, the United States nor the Soviet Union has never seen the need to utilize their ballistic missile defense system to its full capacity. While the upgraded Patriot system may be effective against SCUD missiles, a tactical ballistic missile such as the SCUD is not an ICBM. While the utilization of this system in an operational manner is certainly not desirable, it remains critical that a capable ballistic missile defense remains operational.

 

 

[1] Barry Leonard, History of Strategic and Ballistic Missile Defense, Volume II (Collingdale, Pennsylvania: Diane Publishing Company, 2011), 329.

[2] Leonard, 180.

[3] Spencer Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2012), 311.

[4] Federation of American Scientists, “Safeguard,” Special Weapons Monitor, accessed July 14, 2016, http://fas.org/spp/starwars/program/safeguard.htm.

[5] Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Incident and the Illusion of Safety (New York: Pantheon Books, 2013), 447.

[6] Tim Weiner, “Patriot Missile’s Success A Myth, Israeli Aides Say,” New York Times, November 21, 1993, Accessed July 14, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1993/11/21/world/patriot-missile-s-success-a-myth-israeli-aides-say.html.

[7] R. W. Apple, “War in the Gulf: Scud Attack; Scud Missile Hits a U.S. Barracks, Killing 27,” New York Times, February 26, 1991, Accessed July 14, 2016, http://www.nytimes.com/1991/02/26/world/war-in-the-gulf-scud-attack-scud-missile-hits-a-us-barracks-killing-27.html.

[8] Kari Hawkins, “Patriot Missile System Reaches 50 Years of Service,” Redstone Rocket, August 19, 2015, Accessed July 14, 2016, http://www.theredstonerocket.com/military_scene/article_e3803476-4678-11e5-aa6a-77952ed8b5ff.html.

[9] Jung Sung-Ki, “U.S. Anti-Missile Plans With South Korea Spark Fresh Backlash,” DefenseNews, July 14, 2016, Accessed July 14, 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/2016/07/13/us-antimissile-plans-south-korea-spark-fresh-backlash/87044222/.

“The Cold War: The Game”

The cultural effects of the Cold War were far reaching: movies, music, theater, books, and perhaps most recently, video games. However, it was not until the late 1970s and early 1980s when consumer technology was able to be effectively utilized in a personal, entertainment role. Previously, computers had been too large and unwieldy for home entertainment use. However, with the release of video games such as Pac-Man and Asteroids, dedicated video game systems and the idea of computers-as-entertainment began to gain momentum.

In 1980, the arcade game Missile Command was released. The objective of the game was to shoot down as many enemy missiles as possible before the player was destroyed, which would inevitably happen as the missiles came at the player faster and faster. In other words, there was no way to “win” Missile Command. While the idea of an “un-winnable” video game seems strange by today’s standards, it acted as an accurate representation of the philosophy of Mutually Assured Destruction.

A screenshot from Missile Command. Note the Statue of Liberty in the right hand corner (Photo credit: gamesdbase.com).

By the end of the Cold War, a drastic cultural shift occurred with the collapse of the Soviet Union. No longer was the “Evil Empire” targeting American suburbia with multi-megaton nuclear warheads. As a result, a new, younger generation “had not grown up in a world where talk of nuclear war, radiation, reactors and so forth showed up frequently in the news, and even in personal conversation, within a context drenched with anxiety. Often their first encounters with nuclear topics took place in the tedium of the school room.”[1]  In addition, movies and television shows that featured nuclear war treated the threat as a “cheesy plot device, not a viscerally felt reality.”[2]

In other words, due to the collapse of the Soviet Union, a new, younger generation viewed the threat of nuclear war as a Cold War relic and caused many to view the nuclear culture of the 1950s and 1960s as farcical. As the years passed, and the threat of the Soviet Union continued to diminish, video games such as Goldeneye 007 or Command and Conquer often trivialized the threat of the “Evil Empire.” In many cases, the game’s primary antagonist was a highly caricaturized Russian, complete with a fur hat and greatcoat. Furthermore, video games allowed for the player to freeze the action while they went to refill their soda or use the restroom. Unlike in a real conflict, a player could be fighting off endless waves of computer-generated Soviet tanks one second and pause it the next. With the rise in popularity of video games by the late 1990s, the nuclear threat became as threatening as pixels on a computer screen.

The primary antagonist from Command and Conquer: Red Alert (PC, 2008. Photo credit: cncwika.com)

However, the events of September 11, 2001 acted as a brutal wake-up call to many Americans. A new threat thrust itself onto the forefront of the American consciousness: that of the radicalized Islamic terrorist. Many video games, such as Battlefield 3 and the Call of Duty: Modern Warfare series (first released in 2007) capitalized on this new fear, with the new antagonist hailing from an “unspecified Middle Eastern country.” In games such as these, players often take the role of a Special Operations soldier who is tasked with stopping the next terror attack (often involving a so-called “dirty bomb”) on American or European soil. In the 2000s, countless video games were released based on this premise. It could be argued that these video games acted as a coping mechanism: in a time which a terror attack could come at anytime and anywhere, video games allowed for the feeling that the player was able to control an otherwise uncontrollable situation. In a video game such as Call of Duty: Modern Warfare, the player could be a hero-they could stop the terror cell and save the world.  It allowed the temporary feeling that the player was “doing something” to stop what was otherwise unpredictable violence.

The mid and late-2000s also saw the rise of a new genre: that of the post-apocalyptic game. Games such as Metro 2033 and the Fallout series rested on the premise that a nuclear World War III had already occurred. Instead of preventing a global thermonuclear war, the player was tasked with surviving in a Mad Max-esque world: one with rivaling factions that acted as the last vestiges of a civilized society.

 

 

A post-apocalyptic Washington, D.C. in Fallout 3 (Photo credit: Wikipedia). 

Currently, the release of video games such as Fallout 4 in 2015 illustrate that the Cold War is alive and well in the American consciousness. Admittedly, while historical accuracy is not the priority-after all, their very premise is entertainment rather than educational-atomic and Cold War-themed video games still remain highly popular amongst a younger generation. It remains to be seen how current geopolitical events in countries such as North Korea will shape our cultural perceptions of the potential atomic threat.

 

 

 

[1] Spencer Weart, The Rise of Nuclear Fear (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012), 259.

[2] Paul Boyer, “Sixty Years and Counting: Nuclear Themes in American Culture, 1945 to Present,” in The Atomic Bomb and American Society: New Perspectives, ed. Rosemary Mariner (Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press, 2009), 14.

The Cold War on the Silver Screen

In previous posts, I have described the strategy, tactics and military policy of the United States during the Cold War. But how did the cultural effects of the Cold War percolate into cinema?

From the period of 1945 to the early 2000s, three distinct phases of Cold War movies are evident. First, the period of the early Cold War, from the 1950s to the early 1960s. The second phase manifests itself after the American exit from the Vietnam War from the early 1970s to the 1980s. The immediacy of American involvement in Vietnam from the period 1965-1975 took priority over the nuclear threat of the Soviet Union. Finally, the period from the end of the Cold War in 1991 to shortly after the events of September 11, 2001, represented a drastic shift in the representation of the nuclear danger.

During the first of these phases, movies such as Fail Safe, and the now infamous Dr. Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb acted to represent early American cultural perceptions regarding the Cold War. In many of these movies, such as Fail Safe, the U.S. Air Force’s Strategic Air Command (SAC) played a predominant role. This section of the Air Force controlled all of the nuclear-armed, long range bombers, and in the years prior to ballistic missiles, represented the only nuclear deterrent that the United States possessed.

Dr. Strangelove’s movie poster (Photo credit: Wikipedia). 

Both Fail Safe and Dr. Strangelove made many Americans brutally aware of a new fear. What if a nuclear war was started by mistake? The two movies pointed out that in a crisis, if SAC bombers passed a “point of no return,” there was no way to communicate with the crew to call off the attack. In addition, SAC procedures were often so complex that even if communication was possible, it would not reach the bomber crews in time.[1] These two movies painted a much darker picture than the rosy image of Civil Defense. Suddenly, the infallible safety of the U.S. military was called into question. Could the end of the world really happen by a simple human mistake?

At the end of American military involvement in Vietnam, fears of a Soviet attack began to gradually replace concerns over the Vietnam War. Two films released in 1983 epitomized American cultural concerns regarding a Soviet attack: Wargames and The Day After. By the early 1980s, computer technology had reached a point in which many predicted that robots and automated systems would replace humans. Wargames took this to a new level. Instead of a nuclear war being started by human error, as in Fail Safe, an amateur high school computer hacker inadvertently accesses the computer mainframe of NORAD. The computer, unable to differentiate between a simulation and reality, nearly launches all of the American nuclear arsenal at the Soviet Union. After the main character (played by Matthew Broderick) is able to avert the crisis, the movie concludes that the “only winning move in global thermonuclear war is not to play.”[2] Wargames illustrated that a nuclear Armageddon was now possible due to a computer’s miscalculation.

The movie poster for “The Day After” (Photo credit: Wikipedia). 

The Day After, also released in 1983, was the first movie to graphically depict the after effects of a nuclear strike. Up to this point, video footage of the casualties of Hiroshima and Nagasaki had largely remained classified or otherwise unavailable to the American public.  Films which graphically depicted the human effects of nuclear weapons were not readily available. Rather than emphasizing the sterilized, computer-generated simulations of nuclear war, The Day After examined a Soviet nuclear attack from the perspective of the average citizen. In addition, the film demonstrated that nowhere in the United States was safe from an attack. Previously, it was believed that the Soviet Union would only target installations of strategic and tactical significance, such as military bases and missile silos. However, due to the sheer explosive power of nuclear weapons, The Day After illustrated that even the average American suburb was a target for a nuclear warhead.

Finally, the movie emphasized the mass panic which would occur during a nuclear attack. Many of the casualties were not caused by nuclear weapons; rather they were caused by people attempting to evacuate the city in a mass exodus. Regarding Hiroshima and Nagasaki, the film made only one small, but powerful reference to the bombings:

As the superpower conflict intensifies, but before the bombs actually hit, a physician reveals that residents were already fleeing Kansas City-but did they really think that they would be safe outside the city? “We are not talking about Hiroshima anymore,” [the main character] declares. “Hiroshima was peanuts.”[3] The Day After acted as a sobering revelation to the American public. Suddenly, the threat of nuclear war was no longer an abstract concept which only Pentagon generals and strategists concerned themselves with.

With the fall of the Soviet Union in 1991, it seemed as though the menace of nuclear war temporarily evaporated. Suddenly, the threat of the “Evil Empire” no longer existed, and both Americans and Russians alike breathed a collective sigh of relief. However, by the mid to late 1990s, it soon became apparent that the danger posed by nuclear weapons was still very real. This became brutally evident with the terrorist attacks on September 11, 2001. Suddenly, a small group of rogue terrorists were just as dangerous as a nuclear strike by the Soviet Union.

One year later, the film The Sum of All Fears, was released. In it, a terrorist group obtains a nuclear device and detonates it in a crowded football stadium. The movie’s tagline, “27,000 Nuclear Weapons: And One is Missing” exemplified the new fears of many in the aftermath of September 11.[4] The combination of lax security measures concerning nuclear weapons (largely in former Eastern Bloc countries) and a highly motivated extremist terror group stealing a nuclear device was a very real concern of many Americans.

The theatrical release poster for “The Sum of All Fears” (Photo credit: Wikipedia).

This new threat of a radicalized terror cell stealing a nuclear device and detonating it in a city was radically different from the previous nuclear threat that the Soviet Union represented. A nuclear attack from the Soviet Union had the potential to be predictable or even defended against. With a terror group, such as al-Qaeda or more recently, the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS), predictability is much more difficult. The Sum of All Fears demonstrated an ancient military axiom by Sun Tzu: “Kill one, terrorize a thousand.” A low-yield nuclear device detonated in a city became just as fear-inciting as a full-scale nuclear attack.

Recent movies which depict nuclear attacks often rest on this same premise-that of a terror group or even a “rogue nation” such as North Korea as the prime antagonist, rather than Russia. However, due to recent bellicose rhetoric from Russian President Vladimir Putin, some have begun to predict that the nuclear threat posed by Russia is not a relic of the Cold War. Only time will tell how future geopolitical events will influence our perception of the nuclear threat.

 

[1] Doctor Strangelove or How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Bomb, DVD, Directed by Stanley Kubrick (1964; Los Angeles, California: United Artists, 2003).

[2] Wargames, DVD, directed by John Badham (1983; Burbank, California: United Artists, 2008).

[3] Robert Lifton and Greg Mitchell, Hiroshima in America: Fifty Years of Denial (New York: Putnam Books, 1995). 372.

[4] The Sum of All Fears, DVD, Directed by Phil Alden Robinson (2002; Los Angeles, California: Paramount Pictures, 2002).

How to Win A Nuclear War

Eastern Europe: A not so distant future. Columns of Russian tanks supported by artillery and air support suddenly shatter the calm morning and quickly overwhelm the unsuspecting NATO forces. The United States scrambles its troops to push the Russian units back, however it soon becomes evident that conventional weapons are not enough. To save the remaining American and NATO forces, a lone B-52 bomber takes off from Barksdale Air Force Base in Louisiana, armed with a single nuclear-armed cruise missile. It flies the long trans-Atlantic flight, finally reaching Europe, and fires the missile into the enemy troop formations. It detonates with a force slightly larger than the Hiroshima bomb. The Russians realize that Pandora’s Box has been opened, and decide not to risk a further nuclear war. Negotiations immediately take place.

An AGM-86 cruise missile (Photo credit: Wikipedia). 

Or do they?

The scenario described above is not as far-fetched as many would believe. In previous posts, I have described the numerous types of weapons which were intended to be used in the event of World War III. This post will discuss the implications these weapons would have on  the potential for further escalation.

For many years, it was believed that an American “limited nuclear strike” with a tactical nuclear weapon as previously detailed would result in the Soviet Union backing down. Similar to the dropping of the Hiroshima bomb, which some historians have argued acted as a show-of-force, a tactical nuclear strike on an advancing tank column would force the Soviet Union to the negotiating table. After all, American defense planners figured that not even the Soviets would be willing to further escalate the conflict, and potentially risk a full scale war. While a tactical nuclear strike would break the “nuclear taboo,” it would send a message along the lines of “America has nuclear weapons, and we’re not afraid to use them!” to the Soviet Union.

Not until 1983 was this plan put to the test. The exercise, code named “Proud Prophet,” was radically different than previous simulations. First, instead of using professors or analysts to play the roles, for example of the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs or the Director of the CIA, this time, the real Chairman participated. Second, actual top secret war plans were incorporated into the simulation, rather than using declassified or otherwise redacted versions.[1] Finally, secrecy and incomplete intelligence was incorporated. No one person was aware of the entire situation at any given time-just like in a real conflict.

A scene from the 1983 movie Wargames depicting global thermonuclear war (Image credit: Wargames, United Artists, 1983). 

The attempts at making “Proud Prophet” as realistic as possible paid off. As professor and defense advisor Paul Bracken, in his book The Second Nuclear Age, writes: “The Soviet Union team interpreted the [American] nuclear strikes as an attack on their nation, their way of life and their honor. So they responded with an enormous nuclear salvo at the United States. The United States retaliated in kind. The result was a catastrophe that made all the wars of the past five hundred years pale in comparison….NATO was gone. So was a good part of Europe, the United States and the Soviet Union.”[2]

“Proud Prophet” came as a shock to the policymakers at the Pentagon and other civilian think tanks. A nuclear war didn’t happen because the American or Soviet leaders were crazy: it happened because the leadership faithfully executed the proposed war plan. To put things in perspective, pretend you are a Russian general. You’ve just learned that one of your armored divisions was destroyed by an American nuclear strike. Radioactive fallout is now blowing towards your rear-echelon troops and staging areas. You have been trained to incorporate nuclear weapons into your own war plans. How do you respond?

So, the exercise showed that the thinking behind a “limited nuclear war” with “tactical nuclear weapons” is completely absurd and the war plan was discarded, right?

Wrong.

A training version of a B61 bomb (Photo via Wikipedia). 

In the past few years, the United States has spent billions of dollars upgrading its nuclear arsenal, especially tactical nuclear weapons. The most recent of these, named the “B-61 Life Extension Program (LEP)”, upgraded the current B-61 free-fall nuclear bomb to increase its accuracy and capability to penetrate underground complexes (such as those in Iran or North Korea). Most prominently, former General of the Air Force’s Strategic Command, James Cartwright, made this striking remark: “If I can drive down the yield, drive down, therefore, the likelihood of fallout, etc, does that make it more usable in the eyes of some- some president or national security decision-making process? And the answer is, it likely could be more usable.”[3]

Cartwright’s comment is highly disturbing. Even if the yield of a nuclear weapon is decreased, it is still hundreds of times more powerful than any conventional weapon. Additionally, plans for a new cruise missile, the Long-Range Stand-Off (LRSO) weapon, illustrate that the doctrine of “limited nuclear war” is alive and well.[4] In a wartime scenario, both the B61 and the LRSO are intended to be utilized in a scenario similar to the one described at the beginning of this post.

In the past 71 years, nuclear weapons have only been used in wartime twice. No global superpower wants to risk the escalation of a conflict to the point of a nuclear exchange, however, tactical nuclear weapons increase the risk of intensifying the conflict exponentially. The risk of nuclear war can perhaps be summed up best in a quote from the 1983 movie Wargames, in which the film concludes that, “The only winning move in global thermonuclear war is not to play.”[5]

 

[1] Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age: Strategy, Danger and the New Power Politics (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2013), 84.

[2] Bracken, 88.

[3] Hans Kristensen, “General Cartwright Confirms B61-12 Bomb ‘Could Be More Useable’”, FAS.org, November 5, 2015, https://fas.org/blogs/security/2015/11/b61-12_cartwright.

[4] Aaron Mehta, “Feinstein Takes Aim at Nuclear Cruise Missile Funding,” DefenseNews.com, April 14, 2016, http://www.defensenews.com/story/defense/air-space/strike/2016/04/14/feinstein-lrso-nuclear-cruise-missile-alcm-replacement/83003490/.

[5] Wargames, DVD, directed by John Badham (1983; Burbank, California: United Artists, 2008).

The Good, the Bad and the Ugly

Throughout the Cold War, the United States developed numerous ideas for nuclear weapons: some good, and many that were bad. However, in the context of the Cold War, it was feared that the United States would not have a sufficient number of troops to fight off a Soviet invasion. As a result, tactical nuclear weapons (TNWs) were viewed as the only thing that could “even the odds” against columns of advancing Soviet tanks. In addition, many of these nuclear weapons were developed in the 1950s and 1960s, during a time of great interservice rivalry, which resulted in a “nuclear good and plenty.”[1] Leaders in the Army and Navy raised the argument that the Air Force should not be the only service branch with nuclear weapons. In the new nuclear battlefield, some predicted that the Navy would become obsolete and large ground forces would as well.

In this context, the Army developed weapons such as the Davy Crockett recoilless rifle, the Special Atomic Demolition Munition (SADM) and Medium Atomic Demolition Munition (MADM) and “Atomic Annie,” a 280mm artillery gun. All of these weapons were actively deployed in Germany and Korea to stop massed Soviet tank formations in conjunction with each other to create massive roadblocks of destroyed tanks. The “Davy Crockett,” colloquially known as a “nuclear bazooka,” was the smallest nuclear weapon that ever entered American service. Possibly one of the most bizarre weapons to emerge out of the Cold War, it had a yield of 10 to 20 tons (“tiny” in comparison to other nuclear weapons, but “huge” when compared to conventional weapons). It had a range of 2 to 12 miles and was both man-portable and able to be transported on the back of a Jeep (See “How Big is A Kiloton?” for an image of the Davy Crockett.)[2]

The SADM, often labeled as a “backpack nuke,” was planned to be carried by Special Forces teams and planted at an airfield or an industrial target. In theory, these soldiers would be able to escape the blast, however, the carriers realized that the employment of the SADM was a one-way trip. The MADM was a nuclear land mine (really!) which was planned to be placed in Europe to destroy Soviet armored columns.[3]

An inert SADM on display at the National Museum of Nuclear Science and History in Albuquerque, New Mexico (Photo by T. Backus)

Finally, “Atomic Annie” was a scaled up 240mm artillery gun (the largest in the U.S. arsenal) that could fire a 15 kT shell a distance of twenty miles. Officially named the “M65 Atomic Cannon,” 20 were built by the U.S. Army, but only one live test fire was ever conducted in 1953. Additionally, due to the advancing technology of missiles and rockets, “Atomic Annie” was quickly made obsolete. Despite this, the M65 cannon was deployed to Korea and Germany in a clear show-of-force to the Soviet Union. [4]

In addition, the primary fear of the U.S. military during the early years of the Cold War was that American air defenses were insufficient to protect against massed formations of Soviet bombers. Similar to the fear that land forces would be insufficient to deter a Soviet armored thrust, many feared that current air defenses would be unable to defend against waves of incoming bombers. In response, the Army developed the Nike Hercules surface to air missile, which could carry either a 2, 20 or 40 kT warhead to be fired into massed formations of bombers.[5]

During this time, the Navy also developed their own low-yield nuclear weapons to be deployed on ships. The Navy’s primary nuclear weapons included nuclear depth charges, named the Mk-101 “Lulu” and a nuclear anti-submarine rocket (ASROC). Both the nuclear depth charge and the ASROC had yields of 11 kT and 10 kT, respectively. After launch, the weapons would sink to a pre-determined depth and detonate. However, it was soon realized that the nuclear depth charge lacked a safety device-if it were to accidentally roll off a ship, it could detonate when it sank to the pre-set depth.

Finally, while the Air Force maintained an arsenal of nuclear weapons for missiles and bombs, it also introduced the AIR-2 Genie nuclear tipped unguided rocket in 1957. Similar to the Nike Hercules, it was intended to be fired into Soviet bomber formations. To illustrate the safety of the Genie rocket, “Operation Plumbbob John” was conducted on July 19, 1957. In a highly publicized event, Air Force personnel stood underneath the detonation of the 2 kT nuclear warhead.[6]

If these ideas seem ridiculous, they were. It soon became apparent in testing that many of these weapons were greatly inaccurate and the resulting radiation would be extremely high, so much so that the troops firing it would not be able to be protected or escape. However, these weapons were viewed as the only solution that would present American forces with the slightest chance of survival in a Soviet attack.

 

[1] Paul Bracken, The Second Nuclear Age (New York: Henry Holt and Company, 2012), 47.

[2] L. Douglas Keeny, 15 Minutes: General Curtis LeMay and the Countdown to Nuclear Annihilation (New York: St. Martins Press, 2011), 280.

[3] Eric Schlosser, Command and Control: Nuclear Weapons, the Damascus Accident and the Illusion of Safety (New York: Penguin Books, 2013), 416.

[4] Schlosser, 268.

[5] Thomas B. Cochran, William M. Arkin, and Milton Hoenig, Nuclear Weapons Databook Volume I: U.S. Nuclear Forces and Capabilities (Cambridge: Ballinger, 1987), 45.

[6] Commission for the Comprehensive Nuclear Test Ban Treaty Organization, “Five at Ground Zero,” CTBTO.org, 2010, http://www.ctbto.org/specials/testing-times/19-july-1957-five-at-ground-zero/.

The “Nuclear Taboo”

Since 1945, only two nuclear weapons have been dropped in a wartime scenario. However, during both the Korean and Vietnam Wars, the United States actively considered utilizing nuclear weapons in order to break the stalemate that the war had become.

On the night of June 25, 1950, North Korean troops stormed across the 38^th Parallel and into South Korea. The surprise attack took the ill-prepared and poorly trained South Korean and American forces by surprise. In August, the North Korean forces had forced the South Korean and Americans to the very southeast tip of the peninsula, near the town of Busan. With the landing of American forces at Incheon in September, American and United Nations forces quickly pushed the North Korean forces back to the Chinese perimeter. One month later, the Chinese counterattacked and forced the United Nations to retreat. As the Chinese forces began to overtake them, the United States began to consider nuclear weapons to break the advance of the Chinese.

Soon, nine Mark-4 nuclear bombs (essentially an enhanced version of the bomb dropped over Nagasaki) with their plutonium “physics packages” were transported to Okinawa. In addition, squadrons of B-29 bombers were sent to Britain, and later to Guam, to act as a “show-of-force” for the Soviet Union and potentially China. By late November 1950, the Chinese were being forced back from the Yalu River and President Truman announced in a press conference that the “United States will use every weapon we have” and that “[nuclear weapons] have always been under active consideration.”[1]

 

A Mk-4 nuclear bomb casing (Photo credit: Wikipedia).

By December, President Truman and his advisers concluded that it would be the “height of political folly” to use nuclear weapons in Korea.[2] They came to this conclusion for several reasons. First, the terrain of Korea was unlike that of Japan or Germany: it was far more mountainous and rural. There were no large industrial targets, such as the factories of Germany, and therefore it was debatable how effective nuclear weapons would have been. Additionally, North Korean and Chinese soldiers were relatively dispersed.[3] There were no large armored columns or troop concentrations which would have acted as targets for nuclear weapons.  Second, the resulting fallout from the nuclear blast would be unpredictable-if the wind blew, it could send fallout over China or Japan. Third, from a diplomatic perspective, the Soviet Union and possibly China could rightfully interpret a nuclear strike as an escalation, and would respond with nuclear weapons of their own. Finally, the United Kingdom and France pointed out that a nuclear attack in Korea could potentially leave NATO vulnerable while the United States fought China.[4]

However, the consideration to use nuclear weapons in the Korean War did not end there. In 1951, B-29 bombers conducted practice nuclear bombing runs from Okinawa to North Korea. Named “Operation Hudson Harbor,” it planned nuclear strikes on industrial targets deep inside mainland China.[5]  An envoy was delivered to China to warn them that if the Chinese continued to intervene in Korea, the bombing runs would not be practice ones. On July 27, 1953, the Korean War armistice documents were signed, signaling an end to the war. At least temporarily, the threat of nuclear war seemed to abate.

A B-29 over Korea in 1951 (Photo credit: Wikipedia).

The “nuclear question” was raised once again in the 1960s with American involvement in Vietnam. In 1967, a report was published by the JASON Advisory Group entitled “Tactical Nuclear Weapons (TNWs) in Southeast Asia.” The report reached a similar conclusion as the arguments against the bomb in Korea: the lack of industrial targets, the heavily forested terrain, and the fact that nuclear weapons may have been useful against large formations of Soviet tanks, but not against small groups of guerrilla soldiers.[6]

The cover page of the JASON report (

http://blog.nuclearsecrecy.com/2014/07/25/nukes-helped-vietnam/).

In 1972, nuclear weapons were again considered to end the Vietnam War as quickly as possible. During Operation Linebacker, the United States was attempting to stem the flow of supplies and materiel to the North Vietnamese forces. President Richard Nixon told Secretary of State Henry Kissinger “his interest in using ‘a nuclear bomb’ as an alternative to bombing North Vietnam’s dike system, which was also a step he strongly favored. A nuclear attack against another target, he assumed, would cause fewer civilian casualties yet make a powerful ‘psychological’ impact on Hanoi and the Soviets.”[7]  However, Kissinger and Nixon’s other advisers opposed the idea.

It is important to note that many documents discussing the potential use of nuclear weapons in Vietnam remain classified. In addition, it is unclear as to how serious of a threat Nixon was making. The President was infamous for the so called “madman theory,” that is, to appear to be an irrational pro-war “hawk” who would drop nuclear weapons in an instant in order to intimidate the North Vietnamese into surrender.[8] In reality, it is highly doubtful that Nixon deeply believed in utilizing nuclear weapons against the Vietnamese.

In conclusion, the “nuclear taboo” has not been broken by any country since 1945. It is no stretch of the imagination to infer that the breaking of this nuclear taboo was one of the primary concerns of American political and military leadership during the Korean and Vietnam Wars.  Rational leaders do not desire their country to be judged by history and do not want to be responsible for a full-scale nuclear war. In both cases of Korea and Vietnam, rational thinking and analysis prevailed.

[1] John Lewis Gaddis, The Cold War: A New History (New York: Penguin Books, 2005), 48.

[2] Ibid.

[3] Robert Farley, “What if the United States Had Used the Bomb in Korea?” The Diplomat, January 5, 2016, http://thediplomat.com/2016/01/what-if-the-united-states-had-used-the-bomb-in-korea/.

[4] Harry Truman, Memoirs (Old Saybrook, Connecticut: William S. Konecky Associates, 1955), 394.

[5] Carl Posey, “How the Korean War Almost Went Nuclear,” Air and Space Magazine, July 2015 http://www.airspacemag.com/military-aviation/how-korean-war-almost-went-nuclear-180955324/?no-ist

[6] Nina Tannenwald, “Nuclear Weapons and the Vietnam War,” March 2003, Nautilus Institute http://nautilus.org/essentially-annihilated/essentially-annihilated-nuclear-weapons-the-vietnam-war/.

[7] William Burr and Jeffery Kimball, “Nixon White House Considered Nuclear Option Against North Vietnam, Declassified Documents Reveal,” National Security Archive, July 31, 2006, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/NSAEBB/NSAEBB195/.

[8] William Burr and Jeffery Kimball, “Nixon, Kissinger and the Madman Theory,” National Security Archive, May 29, 2015, http://nsarchive.gwu.edu/nukevault/ebb517-Nixon-Kissinger-and-the-Madman-Strategy-during-Vietnam-War/.